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Extreme Risk, excess return and leverage: the LP formula 
Olivier Le Marois, Julia Mikhalevski, Raphaël Douady 
Abstract 
The LP formula is based upon the substitution of the exogenous risk aversion hypothesis by a 
credit equilibrium hypothesis. This leads to a trade-off between expected blue-sky return – the 
expected return excluding default scenarios – and extreme risk estimated from scenarios leading 
to default. An empirical study on the past 90 years shows that this trade-off curve is almost 
identical across asset classes. In equilibrium, an asset expected blue-sky return is proportional to 
its contribution to extreme risk. Assuming normal returns, we obtain CAPM as a sub-case of the 
LP relation. This relationship makes extreme risk underestimation a strong driver of asset price 
bubbles. 
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I. Introduction 
Pricing risk has been one of the core topics in quantitative finance for more than half a century. It 
dates back to the brilliant and sophisticated theory, the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), 
developed by Harry Markowitz in 1950’s. MPT gives a complete answer to optimal portfolio 
allocation problems, using few assumptions: 
1. The goal of portfolio construction is not to maximize returns; it is to maximize returns by 
unit of variance, while the investor should consider variance of returns undesirable 
(Markowitz [1952]). 
2. There is at least one risk-free asset, whose return is equal to the pure interest rate (Sharpe 
[1964]). 
3. Investors can borrow and lend at equal terms and agree on the prospects of various 
investments in terms of expected returns, standard deviations and correlations (Sharpe 
[1964]). 
Of course, to quote William Sharpe: “Needless to say, these are highly restrictive and 
undoubtedly unrealistic assumptions.”  But he also added: “However, since the proper test of a 
theory is not the realism of its assumptions but the acceptability of its implications, and since 
these assumptions imply equilibrium conditions which form a major part of the classical 
financial doctrine, it is far from clear why this implication should be rejected.” 
 Financial markets, however, have dramatically changed and gained in complexity since 
Markowitz’s seminal paper. Sophisticated financial products, technological advances and 
growing attention of investors and regulators to extreme risk control, reflected by adoption of 
UCITS IV, Basel III and Solvency II directives, prompted numerous “post modern” refinements 
to adapt MPT to the ever-evolving financial markets.  
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Most of the proposed refinements fit in either of the following two categories:  
 Replacing variance by more sophisticated risk measures (Rockafellar and Uryasev 
[2000], Sornette & al. [2000], Rom and Ferguson [1994]). 
 Replacing return maximization by alternative objective functions (DeMiguel [2009]). 
However, at the end of the day, only patches keeping MPT’s fundamentals passed the Sharpe 
acceptability test – such as the Black-Litterman proposition [1992], and passing this test is the 
key to successfully offering a highly structured and consistent framework for the investment 
process. 
In this article we attempt to answer two fundamental questions that address the value of risk 
management beyond regulatory compliance: 
 What is the fair price for risk in terms of short-term performance? 
 What benefits should the investor expect from risk mitigation in terms of long-term 
performance? 
This article contributes to the risk pricing literature in two ways. We derive an equilibrium 
relationship between extreme risk and return without making any specific assumptions about 
asset return distributions or relying on exogenously determined investor utility function. We also 
show that our risk-pricing model provides rationale for asset price bubbles that were at the heart 
of the recent financial crises.  
 
II. From Risk Aversion to Bankruptcy Aversion 
One of MPT’s most fundamental assumptions is that “investors should consider variance as an 
undesirable thing” (Markowitz [1952]). Post-modern approach will replace variance by more 
sophisticated risk measures, such as Value-at-Risk or expected tail loss to name a few. All these 
approaches have one point in common: they assert that “investors should consider risk as an 
undesirable thing”  
Our proposition is to make tabula rasa of this axiom and state that investors may consider risk as 
a desirable thing. This might sound counter intuitive, but it is more likely in line with observed 
investor behavior: after all, taking on more risk allows achieving higher returns, as we shall see 
below. 
On the other hand, to say that most investors consider bankruptcy as a desirable thing not only 
goes against common sense, but also is not even compatible with the existence of sustainable 
capitalism. We then have a new assumption on which to build an asset allocation theory: most 
investors consider bankruptcy as an undesirable thing. 
 
III. Pricing Risk based on Bankruptcy Aversion 
Being bankruptcy-averse means that only those with infinite resources can afford to ignore 
extreme risk.  The rest of us have a maximum level of acceptable loss beyond which very 
unpleasant events start happening, such as bankruptcy and its dramatic consequences: 
legal/compliance troubles, loss of reputation, unemployment and ultimately misery.  
To ban bankruptcy, we need to split the wealth in two portfolios: the Hedge portfolio, which is 
dedicated to serving liabilities, and the risky portfolio, whose purpose is to produce returns.  Of 
course, the frontier between Hedge and Risky Portfolios is subjective and building an adequate 
hedge portfolio is not simple. However, the point here is that the construction of a hedge 
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portfolio has nothing to do with the trade-off between return and risk.  It is just a matter of how 
future cash flows are discounted and what the perceived risk factors driving the liabilities are, so 
that the best hedges can be identified. 
The trade-off between return and risk results from the risky portfolio management. First, let us 
observe that a good practice is to host this risky portfolio as a fund, meaning a limited liabilities 
vehicle, which will invest in risky assets, and finance its investment with equity and debt.  The 
advantage of this fund is that the equity owner can never lose more than 100% of the equity 
while using debt to increase the capital allocated to the assets, and therefore boosting the equity 
excess return vs. the average interest rate charged for the debt. The price paid for this boosted 
returns is that more leverage means more risk, i.e. a higher probability to lose 100% of the 
equity.   
The actual return on equity is quantified by Proposition II of Modigliani and Miller’s theorem, 
ignoring taxes (Modigliani and Miller [1958]): 
 ddde rrrrr
E
D
rr  000 )(   (1.1) 
where re is the leveraged return or equity return, r0 is the assets return or unleveraged return, rd is 
the average cost of debt, D the amount of debt, E the equity and 
E
DE 
   the leverage. We see 
that the leveraged return on equity re depends on 3 variables: the unleveraged asset return r0, the 
cost of debt rd and the level of leverage . 
To derive the expected equity return, we cannot simply replace realized returns by expected 
returns in equation (1.1), since the equity owner benefits from an asymmetrical pay-off: the 
equity loss cannot exceed 100%, while the gain is unlimited. In fact, eq. (1.1) should read: 
  0max 1,e d dr r r r     (1.2) 
Given the asymmetrical nature of the equity holder’s payoff, in order to obtain the expected 
equity return we need to split unleveraged asset return scenarios into 2 categories: 
 Scenarios leading to fund default.  These scenarios happen if the future value of the asset, 
  r0), falls below the amount to be repaid to the lender (– 1)(1 + rd). This gives the 
default triggering unleveraged asset loss, that we note VaR() (for reasons to become clear 
below) as: 
1
( ) d d
r
VaR r


   (1.3) 
In this case, when r0  –VaR(), the expected equity return is re = –100%, regardless of the 
amplitude of asset losses. The excess of loss is equal to –(r0 + VaR()) and is supported 
solely by the fund’s counterparties and the clearing brokers or exchanges1. 
                                               
1
 Posted collateral should be considered as fund’s assets that reduce the leverage.  
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 The blue-sky scenarios. These scenarios do not lead to default. In this case the expected 
equity return will depend on expected blue-sky return (EBSR), i.e. the expected unleveraged 
asset return, ignoring all losses higher than the default threshold VaR: 
))(( 00 VaRrrEEBSR   (1.4) 
The expected equity return in this case is obtained by replacing the realized return r0 in equation 
(1.1) by the expected blue-sky return: 
))(())(( 0 dde rEBSRrEVaRrrE                         (1.5) 
If we denote by q the probability of a blue-sky scenario, i.e. of non-default, then the expected 
equity return becomes, noting that re = –1 in case of default: 
 0E( ) E ( ) 1e er q r r VaR q      (1.6) 
The threshold VaR() is clearly a function of the confidence level q: the higher the confidence, the higher 
the loss threshold. Remembering that the maximum loss an asset will not exceed with a given probability 
q is exactly the definition of Value-at-Risk, we may denote the unleveraged asset default threshold, as a 
function of the confidence level q, the Value-at-Risk, VaR(q). Since the default threshold is a function of q, 
it follows that EBSR can also be expressed as a function of q. Therefore, the expected equity return can 
be expressed as a function of q, instead of the leverage , according to the following equation, that one 
obtains after a short calculation (see Appendix 1 for a proof): 
 
( ) ( )
1 ( ) 1
( )
e d
d
EBSR q VaR q
E r q r
r VaR q

  

 (1.7) 
This relationship establishes the first trade-off between risk and return in our model:  the higher the 
confidence level q, the higher the Value-at-Risk and thus (from equation (1.3)) the lower the leverage and 
the lower expected equity return.  Consequently higher default risk results in lower expected equity return. 
By the same reasoning we can infer that once the equity investor sets an acceptable level of confidence 
q, only 3 parameters determine his/her expected return: 
- VaR(q), the level of possible loss on the underlying asset, 
- EBSR(q), the expected unleveraged gain excluding losses higher than VaR(q), 
- rd, the cost of debt. 
Indeed, the leverage  is deduced from the default triggering threshold VaR(q). 
 
IV. Introducing an Efficient Credit Market: the Leveraged Portfolio formula (LP) 
Up until now we assumed that the confidence level of non-default q was given. In this section we 
show that this probability is a result of equilibrium in the credit markets. 
Let us first consider an investors perspective. An equity owner with a low bankruptcy aversion 
will choose a confidence level that maximizes equity return. Can equity returns reach an infinite 
level?    
Considering equation (1.7), if the cost of debt rd does not depend on confidence level q, the 
investor can choose the confidence level q in such a way so that VaR(q) is very low and that the 
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denominator is close to zero (typically for values of q around 50%), in which case the expected 
equity return can reach a very high level simply because the leverage  is inversely proportional 
to VaR(q) (equation (1.3)) and will consequently be almost infinite in that case.   
Of course, if lenders are rational, they will charge higher interest rates for higher probabilities of 
default, thus making borrowing unattractive for investors at some point. In other words, the cost 
of debt is a function of the default probability, which we may write rd(q). The optimal leverage 
from an investors perspective will therefore be reached when the additional cost of one unit of 
debt is exactly offset by the additional revenue provided by that unit of debt. From equation (1.7) 
we know that the investor only considers blue-sky return of unleveraged asset as  incremental 
revenue. As a result, the optimal leverage from an investors perspective is reached when the 
marginal cost of debt equals the marginal blue-sky return. 
From a rational lenders standpoint, the marginal interest rate ( )dr q  charged for the latest unit of 
debt is made up of 2 components: 
  1 ( ) 1 1 ( )d fr q r s q     (1.8) 
rf : a fixed cost of debt, i.e. an  interest charge that contains all operational risk factors related to 
creditworthiness of the fund management company and which is independent of the level of leverage; 
- s(q) : a credit spread that increases with leverage, reflecting higher risk of default due to 
trading losses for higher levels of leverage.  
If the credit market is efficient, this credit spread, charged for one unit of additional debt, should 
equal the cost of default: 
 
1
1 ( ) (1 ) 0 1 ( )
q
q s q q s q
q

        (1.9) 
We see from equation (1.9) that the lower the confidence q that the fund will survive, the higher the credit 
spread s(q).  
By combining the optimum leverage conditions from an investor perspective with equation (1.9), 
we can express the market equilibrium in very simple terms: it is reached when the expected 
blue-sky excess return over the fixed cost of the debt is exactly equal to the credit spread on the 
debt, itself equal to the cost of default (see Appendix 1 for technical proof): 
 1 * 1
1 ( *)
1 *f
EBSR q
s q
r q

  

 (1.10) 
where q* is the equilibrium confidence level. One could also interpret the probability q* as a risk aversion 
level, at which the expected blue-sky return EBSR(q) of unleveraged assets exactly offsets the marginal 
cost of the debt. This equilibrium level can be calculated by solving equation (1.10), or more simply, by 
stipulating that the expected blue-sky return EBSR is an exogenous variable based on investors’ views on 
unleveraged assets expected performance, ignoring all the default scenarios. 
From now on, we shift from considering the survival probability q as leading variable, to taking 
EBSR as leading parameter instead, so that we have: 
1
( )
1
fr
q EBRS
EBSR



 (1.11)< 
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Then, in order to derive the optimal level of leverage and the expected equity return, we 
cumulate, unit by unit, the benefit obtained from each additional tranche of debt up to the point 
where the cost of an additional unit of debt is equal to the expected blue-sky return. This process 
is illustrated in Figure 1.  
The fund will take on additional debt up to the level where the marginal blue-sky return equals 
the marginal cost of debt, with the black area representing the expected equity return. A higher 
expected blue-sky return leads to a higher equilibrium level of leverage and thus to a higher 
expected leveraged equity return. On the other hand, higher default risk will limit access to 
leverage and result in a lower expected leveraged equity return. 
 
 
 
 
The equilibrium conditions established above allow us to derive the expected leveraged equity 
return in excess of fixed cost of debt achieved assuming that credit markets are efficient (see 
Appendix 1 for technical proof):  
 
 
 
def
( ) exp 1
1 ( )f
EBSRe f
r
f
E r r dx
LP EBSR q EBSR
r x VaR q x
  
      
  (1.12) 
where: 
- re is the leveraged equity return 
- rf is the fixed cost of debt 
-  
x
r
xq
f



1
1
 is the equilibrium survival probability corresponding to a given expected blue-
sky return x 
- VaR(q) is the Value-at-Risk of the unleveraged asset, for a given percentile q and a time 
horizon H equal to debt maturity.    
Figure 1: 
Optimal leverage 
with equilibrium 
in credit markets. 
The graph shows 
the relationship 
between expected 
blue-sky return, 
default risk and 
optimal leverage. 
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- EBSR is the expected blue-sky return, i.e. the expected return on the unleveraged asset, 
ignoring all default scenarios corresponding to losses of the unleveraged asset beyond 
VaR(q(EBSR)), where 
1
( )
1
fr
q EBSR
EBSR



. 
The expected long-term return for an investor results from leveraged returns, rolling each period 
the leverage according to short-term return expectation and extreme risk. For this reason it can be 
viewed as equal to the leveraged returns as given by the LP function above. 
 
 
This long-term return potential is driven solely by the distribution of unleveraged asset returns, 
split in two variables, as shown in Figure 2: 
- The expected blue-sky return, i.e. the average return above the default threshold (the blue 
area in Figure 2). This corresponds precisely to the observed investor behavior: investors 
tend to ignore scenarios leading to default when estimating return potential of an asset. 
- Extreme risk represented by a cumulative function of default scenarios (dark area in Figure 
2). 
Business as usual risk – typically reflected by volatility – has no direct impact on the long-term 
performance, which seems in contradiction with one of the key fundamentals of MPT.  However, 
by assuming that default risk is only driven by volatility (for instance if the distribution of returns 
is Gaussian), we can retrieve the relationship between expected return of an asset and its 
volatility as in MPT. 
 
V. Empirical study: Expected Long Term Returns of traditional asset classes 
To illustrate the LP function we consider short-term excess returns of 3 different asset classes: 
equity (S&P 500), bonds (10 year T-notes) and commodities (gold and oil). Using their historical 
distributions for the past 90 years and different short-term return EBSR0 in excess of fixed cost of 
debt as a parameter, we determine by applying the LP function above, the expected long-term 
excess return as a function of short-term excess return. We took as a fixed cost of debt the 3-
month US Libor interest rate. 
Figure 2: 
Default risk and 
blue-sky returns 
as determinants 
of long-term 
equity return. 
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Figure 3 below plots this relationship. The three points highlighted on each curve correspond to 
the realized short-term excess return over the last 10, 25 and 90 year period.  
We observe that the slope of the curve is inversely proportional to the extreme risk of the asset, 
with bonds having the highest slope. In the most recent period the graph clearly shows the 
commodity bubble as reflected by high short-term excess returns of oil and gold, as well as 
equities underperformance relative to bonds. It is interesting to note that short-term excess 
returns calculated over a very long period (90 years) are clustered in the range where there is 
relatively little variability in values of LP function for different assets; and where the differences 
in asset extreme risk have less impact on the expected long term leveraged return. By contrast, 
short-term returns calculated over shorter periods (10 years, for instance) are characterized by 
much higher variability and thus higher dispersion in expected long-term leveraged excess 
returns. Intuitively, if we expect a 20% excess short term return for bonds, given much lower 
extreme risk profile associated with this asset compared to, say S&P500, we would expect a 
much higher long term excess return achieved through higher leverage. 
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VI. Empirical study: Trade-off between Extreme Risk and Blue-Sky Returns 
For a given targeted leveraged return, we can derive a trade-off between short-term return 
expectation and extreme risk. Unfortunately, there are no simple risk-return ratios to express this 
trade-off, as the Sharpe ratio, and all its postmodern patches (RORAC, return/expected short fall 
etc). The reason is that this trade-off involves the entire distribution of default scenarios. Trying 
to simplify this opens the door to financial products that take advantage of flaws in investment 
theory, as sub-primes successfully did. Having said that, we can reasonably assume a certain 
persistence in the shape of tail distributions for risk factors that drive asset returns, provided 
estimated on sufficiently long historical periods, and therefore derive an empirical trade-off 
Figure 3: LP 
function applied to 
historical 
distribution of 
quarterly returns. 
The chart shows 
the relationship 
between blue-sky 
return in excess of 
fixed cost of debt 
and the expected 
leveraged excess 
return, using the 
historical 
distribution of 
returns over 90 
years to estimate 
the default risk 
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between expected blue sky short term return EBSR0 and estimated 99% Value-at-Risk, shifting 
the tail distribution proportionally. 
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Continuing the previous example, we can estimate the required blue-sky excess return EBSR0 as 
a function of the expected VaR99 level for a given level of targeted leveraged return, in this case 
10% per annum, for each asset class. The results are presented in Figure 4. 
As expected, higher expected extreme risk will require higher short-term excess return to achieve 
the same level of expected leveraged performance because of resulting limited access to 
leverage. For instance, in Figure 4, if for T-Bonds the VaR99 estimation is 25% per year, then it 
has to deliver a little more than 2% of blue-sky excess return to achieve a 10% leveraged return 
target.  Remarkably, we observe a very similar relationship between extreme risk and required 
blue-sky return for all asset classes even though historical VaRs are quite different. We also note 
that the Gaussian distribution appears to be a very good proxy for all asset classes. This of course 
does not imply that asset distributions are Gaussian, just that the trade-off between expected 
blue-sky return and extreme risk is similar to that of a Gaussian distribution. 
 
 
 
VII. LP formula and the Sharpe acceptability test: the “extended” CAPM 
Let us assume as in W. Sharpe seminal paper (Sharpe [1964]), that we are in a fully efficient 
financial market with rational expectations. In that case, does the LP formula verify the general 
equilibrium condition as predicted by classical and new classical economic theory? 
We can observe that the net market portfolio, which combines hedge portfolios and liabilities, is 
neutral in respect to factor prices under the homogenous expectations assumptions. To see that, 
let us imagine that a new pension regime is created, with a stream of future cash flows as 
Figure 4: 
Required blue-sky 
excess return to 
achieve 10% 
leveraged return 
as a function of 
estimated Var99 
for different asset 
classes. Historical 
VaR99 is 
calculated based 
on 90 years of 
history (1921-
2011). 
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liabilities. If markets are efficient and rational, then the forward interest rate will immediately 
move in response to this anticipation. This movement will be exactly neutralized if the pension 
plan hedges each dollar of the liability. As a result we can conclude that the hedge portfolio has 
no impact on asset prices, which are determined solely by the risky portfolio. 
As a consequence we can apply the same line of reasoning as in Sharpe’s seminal paper (Sharpe 
[1964]) and infer that only the aggregate risky portfolio matters for market equilibrium: at the 
equilibrium all investors will hold a risky portfolio with the same expected LP value (replacing 
the Sharpe ratio). We can then derive, like W. Sharpe, the expected return distribution of each 
asset, based on its marginal contribution to the total market expected LP (Appendix 3 provides 
technical details):  
 i m f i m f
i
EBSR
r EBSR r
w


  

 (1.13) 
Expression (1.13) is very similar to the fundamental CAPM equation  
   i f i m fE r r E r r        with 2 major differences: 
 
- The beta in LPT framework is based on the contribution to the extreme risk (see 
Appendix 3 for details), unlike the CAPM beta that that is estimated from the entire 
distribution of the returns. This is a very fundamental result: the short-term return that 
an asset has to deliver depends solely on its contribution to the extreme risk. 
- An asset’s contribution to the blue-sky return of the portfolio is not determined by the 
blue-sky return of the asset, but by its expected return conditional on the market default 
scenarios not being realized. 
This is an intuitive result: investors naturally will split potential returns of an asset in 2 
categories: what happens if markets (and not the asset itself) behave normally, and what 
happens in extreme crisis-like market environment.  
 
The extreme beta calculation in equation (1.13) is considerably simplified if the asset 
contribution to the market Value-at-Risk is constant in the confidence interval [q*, 1], where q* 
corresponds to the level of confidence in market equilibrium.  In that case, the beta of an asset is 
exactly equal to the asset contribution to the market Value-at-Risk (see Appendix 3 for technical 
details):    
( *)1
( *)
i
i
f i
VaR q
r VaR q w



   (1.14) 
This observation has very practical key implications for certain class of risk models: 
1/ Non linear factor models.  In non linear factor models the beta between the asset and the 
factors is estimated  conditional onfactors return.  The beta can then be used to estimate a Value 
At Risk based on factor distribution quantile with the resulting VaR taking into account the 
actual tail distribution of the underlying factors as well as tail correlation. In this  VaR model, the 
LPT beta becomes: 
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 
 
i
i
w
qVaR
qVaR 


1
  (1.15) 
This means that the expected contribution of an asset to the blue sky return of the portfolio is 
proportional to its expected contribution to portfolio VaR, giving here a strong foundation for a VaR-
based risk budgeting policy, when accounting for tail correlations. 
 
2/ Gaussian model. If assets returns are jointly log-normally distributed, then an asset 
contribution to Value-at-Risk is independent of the level of confidence q and is equal to the asset 
contribution to the market volatility.  The latter is defined as ii
i
i Cor
w





, then in case of a 
Gaussian distribution: 
i
i iCor



  (1.16)          
     
This is precisely the definition of the beta in the CAPM: if all assets distributions are Gaussian, 
then the LPT beta is exactly equal to the CAPM beta.  
 
VIII. Is LP formula sufficiently general? 
The discussion in previous sections clearly shows that in LP framework leverage plays a key role 
in pricing asset risk.  A legitimate question to ask then is whether our approach is general enough 
to be applied to situations where borrowing is restricted. 
The investor who has no access to leverage can always choose to invest in a combination of 
assets that implicitly contains the optimal amount of leverage. One obvious class of assets 
offering implied leverage is hedge funds, which frequently offer several versions of the 
underlying fund with different levels of leverage. Another asset class is a company stock: 
companies finance their assets by a combination of stock and debt, thereby eliminating the need 
for the shareholder to borrow in order to reach the optimal leverage. Derivative products, in 
particular listed futures, are a very effective and widely used source of leverage. 
Moreover, LP formula relies solely on the assumption that credit markets are efficient in pricing 
the risk of default, an investor who chooses to borrow to obtain the optimal level of leverage 
should therefore simply be as efficient as credit markets in order for LP formula to hold. 
In conclusion, the price of risk is determined solely by the optimal trade-off between the 
expected blue-sky return and the distribution of default scenarios. The source of financing, the 
legal structure of the company or investment payoff  type have no bearing on asset long-term 
return potential. 
 
IX. The cost of bad Extreme Risk estimation   
Understanding the consequence of an error in expected return estimation is quite straightforward, 
and there is no new learning here. Let us therefore assume a hypothetical world of rational 
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expectations, in which the average blue-sky returns prediction happens to be correct. What about 
the impact of an error in extreme risk estimation? 
Suppose that for a given asset the risk is underestimated, for instance because all market 
participants use Gaussian model calibrated on a recent blue-sky period. In that case, it means that 
for a given level of leverage, the probability of default will be underestimated and the spread 
charged for the leverage will be lower than the true cost of default. Low cost of debt will lead 
portfolio managers to use excessive leverage and hence to over-allocate to this asset. This over-
allocation will in turn lead to an over-performance of the asset relative to its expected return 
based on rational expectations models. The potential increase in expected blue-sky returns can 
lead to an additional increase in the leverage and so on. 
As we can see, this risk underestimation will trigger inflation of the asset price relative to other 
assets (and vs the spreads), i.e. a bubble, initiated by credit that is too cheap and fueled by the 
resulting excessive demand for the asset. A favorable outcome would be a bubble burst, when 
lenders realize that the spread they charge is insufficient in real terms and the cost of credit will 
rise thus bringing asset price to equilibrium. More likely though, the bubble will then turn into an 
asset price deflation spiral, as lenders shift from risk underestimation to risk overestimation.  
To quote W. Sharpe: “since the proper test of a theory is not the realism of its assumptions but 
the acceptability of its implications….”, we can see that LPT gives a rational foundation to sub-
prime like crisis and other bubbles fueled by cheap credit and risk underestimation. It also 
supports most recent macro-economic models, namely those advocated by Hyman Minsky, 
which give debt accumulation by non-government sector the dominant role in the formation of 
speculative asset price bubbles (Minsky [1992]). 
 
X. Conclusion 
Recent financial crisis raised important questions about the impact of extreme risk budget in 
asset allocation decisions.  In this paper we developed a novel approach to pricing risk, based on 
bankruptcy aversion and equilibrium in efficient credit markets. We derived an analytical 
formula, the LP function, that establishes a long term return potential of an asset by combining 
the blue-sky return expectation on the unleveraged asset and its default risk distribution. Long-
term data show that the tradeoff between blue-sky return and extreme risk is remarkably similar 
across asset classes. By introducing the CAPM hypothesis on market efficiency, we show that at 
the equilibrium, an asset’s contribution to the market blue-sky return should be proportional to its 
extreme risk contribution, which, if returns distributions are assumed to be Gaussian, is 
equivalent to CAPM fundamental theorem. 
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XI. Appendix 1: Proof of the LP formula 
Expected leveraged equity return from investor’s stand point 
In this section we derive the relationship between expected equity return, E(re), the 
confidence level q, the expected asset return conditional on non-default EBSR, the leverage  
and the cost of debt rd.  
Considering the distribution function  of the expected unleveraged return, one get can 
estimate the probability that the fund will not default: 
 0 0
( )VaR q
q r dr


      (A1.1) 
 with default threshold defined in equation (1.3): 
 
1 d
d
r
r VaR q


       (A1.2)  
The expected equity return defined in equation (1.6) becomes:  
   
   
( )
0 0 0 0 0 0
( ) 1
( 1) ( ) ( )
( ) ( 1) 1
VaR q
e d
VaR q
d
E r r r r dr r r dr
q EBSR q r q
   
 
 
 
   
    
 
   (A1.3)  
with  
  0 0 0
( )
1
( )
VaR q
EBSR q r r dr
q



   .  
Inserting the default triggering equation (1.3) into the expression for expected equity return, 
we finally get the expected equity return as a function of the confidence q: 
        
( ) ( )
1 1
( )
e d
d
EBSR q VaR q
E r q EBSR q VaR q q r
r VaR q


    

   (A1.4)  
 
Optimal leverage condition 
From the investor standpoint, the optimum will be reached when adding more leverage has 
no impact on his leveraged equity return: 
  0 0 0 0 0 0
1
( ) 0 1 ( ) ( )
VaR
e d
VaR
E r r r r dr r r dr   
 

 
       
        (A1.5)  
Using the default triggering condition (1.3) and equations (1.8) and (1.9) we obtain  
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    0 0 0
1
1 ( ) 1 1 0
f
d
VaR
r VaR
r r dr VaR VaR r
q
   



  
        
 
    (A1.6)  
Simplifying we get the required equilibrium relationship: 
 
 
 
    
0 0 0 0
1
1 1
1
1 1 1
f
f
VaR VaR
f
f
r
r dr r dr r q
q
r
EBSR q r s
q
 
 
 
 
     
 
 


    
 
                           (A1.7)  
LP function 
To derive the LP function let us introduce the following variables: 
  : the excess return vs the fixed cost of debt rf  with 
fr
r



1
1
1  ,  
  : the excess blue-sky return with 11
1 f
EBSR
r


 

  
  : the excess risk of unleveraged asset in excess of fixed cost of debt with  
 
1
1
1
f
f
f
r
r VaR
x
v x
r
 
  
 


 
The default triggering equation (1.3) becomes: 
  11  sv                                                 (A1.8)  
Differentiating it we get: 
sv
dvd




                                                      (A1.9)  
The expect equity excess return equation becomes: 
     vqE e1                                           (A1.10)  
And the equilibrium equation becomes simply:  
q
q
s


1
                                                     (A1.11)  
Using s as a variable rather than q, and integrating equation (A1.9) we get the relationship 
between the leverage and the spread: 
 
    

s
xvx
dx
Exp
svs
s
0
1
                                  (A1.12)  
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Inserting (A.11) and (A.12) into (A.10) we get the excess equity return as a function of the 
blue-sky excess return and of the excess extreme risk: 
   
 
1
1
1
0







 



xvx
dx
ExpLPE e                       (A1.13)  
Converting back to the absolute return variable, we get: 
 
 
 
1
1 f
Stre f
r
f
E r r dx
q EBSR Exp
r x VaR q x
 
  
      
      with  
x
r
xq
f



1
1
 (A1.14)  
The trade-off between extreme risk and return  
If we assume that the shape of default risk is determined by Value-at-Risk with 99% 
confidence level (VaR99), then we can derive the risk function of unleveraged asset by using 
different levels of expected VaR99 as a parameter:  
   
 
1 1 99
u q
VaR q VaR    (A2.1)  
The function u describes the shape of the tail distribution and we assume that it is 
independent from VaR99, which gives the level of tail distribution. 
Typically, the function u can be estimated using historical distributions, in which case taking 
log of (A2.1) we get: 
 
 
 
1
1 99
Ln VaR q
u q
Ln VaR
  

  
                                         (A2.2)  
If we suppose a Gaussian distribution then: 
 
NormInv( )
NormInv(0.99)
q
u q                                            (A2.3)  
From this we can derive a relation between the blue-sky excess return and VaR99 for a given 
level of expected equity return: 
       
 
  
1 2 1 1
1 1 99f
EBSR
e f u q xr
dx
Ln E r Ln r Ln EBSR
x VaR
     
  
  (A2.4)  
Extended Sharpe relation 
The asset contribution to the market blue-sky return 
Let us assume, as in W. Sharpe’s seminal paper (Sharpe [1964]), that all investors face the 
same cost of fixed debt and have identical views on expected returns and default risk of 
different assets. In that case, by maximizing expected long-term equity return, all investors 
choose the same portfolio (“market portfolio”) with identical value of LP function.  
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The optimal asset weights wi for assets i = 1…n satisfy the following condition at the 
optimum: 
 
0


i
i
w
LP 
                                                       (A3.1)  
Taking log of (A1.13) and calculating partial derivative with respect to position (i), we get: 
 
     
0
1
1
1
11
1 0 20 2




































dx
vx
v
v
v
dx
vx
v
vLP
LP iii
i
i
 (A3.2)  
This can be written as  


i
i
i
w



                                                           (A3.3)  
with  
   
  




0 2
dx
vx
wv ii
i                                      (A3.4)  
and 
 
  
 v
v



1
1


                                               (A3.5)  
If we convert A3.3 into the absolute return, we get: 
 i m f i m f
i
EBSR
r EBSR r
w


  

                                      (A3.6)  
Beta calculation 
We show in Appendix 3 below that the blue-sky return is homogenous and that 1 iiw  . 
Then the generic beta expression (A3.4) becomes: 
 
    




0 20 2
dx
vx
v
dx
vx
wv ii
i                               (A3.7)  
Expressed in absolute returns: 
 
  
   
  
   
2 2
f f
EBSR EBSRi i f
i
r r
VaR q x w r VaR q x
EBSR dx dx
x VaR q x x VaR q x

  

 
   with  
x
r
xq
f



1
1
  
This formula become much simpler if the contribution of a position to the VaR can be written 
as 
(A3.8) 
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 VaRrk
w
VaR
fi
i
i 


                                           (A3.9)  
with ki constant for percentiles superior to q(EBSR). In that case:  
 VaRr
w
VaR
f
i
i
i 


                                  (A3.10)  
Blue-sky returns are homogenous 
In this section we show that the aggregated blue-sky excess return ε, and hence the absolute 
return EBSR, is a homogenous but not an additive function. 
First let us observe that i
i
i
w
 

 . That is because when we tilt the position in asset (i) by iw , 
the resulting change in blue-sky return of the portfolio will depend on the average return of 
asset (i) conditional on market, and not asset (i) default scenarios not being realized. 
However, as we shall prove below, the blue-sky return is a homogeneous function, meaning 
that the partial derivatives are additive: 



i
i
i
w
w

 . 
Based on (A1.3), the market excess blue-sky return is defined as: 
       dd
q
vVaR


 11                                    (A3.11)  
where   is the expected excess return of the asset. 
If the position i is tilted by dwi and the overall allocation by – dwi (to keep a constant 
leverage), then the expected excess return of each market scenario will be impacted by 
  ii w 0 . 
The market blue-sky return        dd
q
vVaR


 1
1
 will hence be impacted in 2 
ways: first, the direct impact on the expected blue-sky return assuming the default threshold 
does not change; second, the impact on market default probability: 
 
   
 
  ii
v
ii
ii
i wvvvvdw
w










 







2
11
    (A3.12)  
From this, we can derive that   
   
 
  












  

v
w
v
wvvdw
w
wT
i
i
i
v
ii
i
i
i 


        (A3.13)  
For each market scenario, the position impact is additive, meaning 0  iiw . The risk 
function v (the VaR) is homogeneous too, meaning that 0


 v
w
v
w
i
i
i
, hence T =0, which 
demonstrate that the blue-sky returns are homogeneous.  
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